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INTRODUCTION
This Note concerns the past and present of the Texas death penalty's
"future dangerousness" standard. One of three "special questions" in Texas's
original death penalty bill, the future dangerousness question asks "whether
there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society."' An affirmative vote,
under almost all circumstances, results in a death sentence.2 And as many have
recognized, the ambiguities in the question pose enormous problems for judges
t Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2007; Harvard University, A.B. 2003. Great thanks to Jamie
Kaplan for her constant support, to Noelle Duarte Grohmann for her invaluable editing efforts, and to
the many friends who deserve all the credit for whatever insight my writing displays. Special thanks to
the staff of the Texas Legislative Library in Austin, whose contribution to the original research cannot
be underestimated. Finally, the greatest thanks to Stephen Bright, who has dedicated his life to justice in
capital punishment, and whose passion inspired this work.
1. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(b)(1) (Vernon 2005).
2. See infra Section ILA; see also infra note 15 (noting that although the Texas scheme employs
multiple questions, the future dangerousness question is usually, in practice, the only question that
determines the sentencing outcome).
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and juries seeking to answer it in a principled way. 3 At the same time, the
apparently predictive nature of the inquiry has invited into the courtroom a kind
of "expert testimony" on future criminal behavior so discredited that its
practitioners have been expelled from the governing bodies of American
4psychiatry. These criticisms of the future dangerousness standard are not new,
and indeed, they have failed to impress majorities of the highest courts of both
Texas and the United States.5 Yet even with repeated stamps of court approval,
the problems of future dangerousness remain and continue to contribute to
judicial uneasiness with the Texas death penalty.6 The unique problems of the
future dangerousness question are thus a special part of the drive for capital
punishment reform in Texas.7 This Note seeks to add a new voice, sounding in
historical concerns about democratic legitimacy and the legislative process that
produced future dangerousness, to the chorus already calling for reform.
Research into primary sources shows that future dangerousness arose from
a last-minute conference committee compromise that was never debated on the
floor of either chamber of the Texas Legislature.8 The Texas House had passed
a mandatory death penalty, while the Senate had passed a more discretionary
bill on the model of the Model Penal Code.9 On the very last weekend of the
legislative session, a conference committee was called to craft a resolution. On
the very last morning, it floated its solution to both houses. Therein was a
wholly new sentencing procedure with a wholly new animating standard
concerned with the future dangerousness of the convicted defendant. Nothing
of the sort had appeared in either of the bills upon which the conference
committee was conferring. Nonetheless, the bill passed both chambers with
almost no debate or opposition. No word having anything to do with future
dangerousness ever escaped the mouth of any legislator on the floor of either
house. 10
Drawing attention to this finding is not intended as an indictment of the
3. See infra Section II.B.
4. See infra Section II.C.
5. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); Barefoot v. State, 596 S.W.2d 875 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1980); Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975), affd, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
6. See Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 462-69 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J., specially concurring)
(discounting expert testimony on future dangerousness).
7. TEX. DEFENDER SERV., DEADLY SPECULATION: MISLEADING TEXAS CAPITAL JURIES WITH
FALSE PREDICTIONS OF FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS (2004).
8. Texas began recording legislative debates and committee meetings in 1973, the same year that
the state legislature passed the new death penalty bill. However, coverage from the earlier years is spotty
and many records are missing or incomplete. The gaps in the story must be filled in by local newspaper
accounts and personal recollections. This Note appears to be the first to undertake this project.
9. At the time, the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code advocated a death penalty statute
with a relatively long list of both aggravating and mitigating factors for the jury to consider. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1962). Georgia adopted a death penalty bill on this model, and it was upheld by
the Supreme Court on the same day as the new Texas bill. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 &
n.44 (1976) (citing the Model Penal Code list).
10. See infra Part Ill.
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1973 legislators who produced House Bill 200-Texas's post-Furman" re-
enactment statute. It was their situation, more than their actions, which
accounted for this result. The problems they faced were difficult indeed: they
were attempting to embody overwhelming popular support for the death
penalty while facing review by a United States Supreme Court that spoke in
nine distinct voices when it struck down the death penalty the year before.
2
The Texas Legislature also meets only once every two years, is composed
largely of amateur lawmakers, and had substantial business in 1973 other than
the death penalty.' 3 Thus, the fact that the entire Texas death penalty procedure
and its future dangerousness standard were the product of great rush and some
confusion is in fact quite standard fare for state legislation. A law is a law, and
though the one that Texas passed in instituting future dangerousness was the
product of very flawed processes, the ordinary answer is and should be: "So
what? This sort of thing happens all the time."
As to that question, I have two modest observations to make in using this
legislative history to point the way to reform. The first is that, given the
important ambiguities in the future dangerousness standard, it is troubling to
find no guidance in the legislative record. I should admit that I first turned to an
investigation of H.B. 200's legislative history to try to resolve questions about
what future dangerousness meant to those who chose it as Texas's ultimate
standard for the ultimate sanction. That search proved to be futile. We cannot
look to the record for interpretative advice because the plain truth is that Texas
legislators then knew no more than judges and juries do now about how to
understand the standard largely because they had not thought about it. As this
Note shows, there are real ambiguities in how the provision should be
interpreted and applied, and it is troubling to think that these questions simply
escaped attention when the standard was created.
This leads to the second point. It may be true that much state legislation is
produced with great hurry and with minimal introspection, but it seems natural
to expect more where the death penalty is concerned-to demand a better
legislative process for the death penalty because "death is different."' 14 The
11. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (invalidating existing punishment schemes).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Bo Byers, Legislature's Major Bills Up in the Air, HOUSTON CHRON., May 27, 1973
(detailing major initiatives still unresolved on the final day of the session). In the main, Texas legislators
were extremely concerned in 1973 about incipient allegations of state government corruption-
specifically in regards to legislative lobbying. Thus, an ethics bill was at the top of the legislative
priority list, and remained unresolved as of the session's final morning. Id.
14. The premise has some judicial authority behind it. As Justice Stewart wrote for the Court's
plurality in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), "[i]n Furman, members of the Court
acknowledged what cannot fairly be denied-that death is a punishment different from all other
sanctions in kind rather than degree." Id. at 303-04. And as Justice Brennan once noted in dissenting
from a denial of an application for a stay of execution, "death is different." Streetman v. Lynaugh, 484
U.S. 992, 995 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Note, on the other hand, that the notion that the death
penalty generates unique demands for judicial scrutiny is also routinely derided in acerbic dissents. See,
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Texas Legislature is composed of busy people and they cannot be expected to
spend each session second-guessing the statutorily enacted judgments of their
predecessors. For that reason, the capital scheme of the 63rd Legislature has
stayed on the books for over thirty years, with major changes only when the
Supreme Court has called for them. 15 Yet given the problems associated with
future dangerousness, it seems especially relevant for legislators today to know
the conditions under which it was forged, for that may convince them that it is
finally time to revisit the issue. And at the very least, those who tend to view
the death penalty as the product and embodiment of a special kind of
communal moral judgment will know how ordinary this legislation really was.
It is possible, if unlikely, that this information will have an impact on
federal and state court judges who routinely review claims about the future
dangerousness standard. One of the reasons that legislative judgments are
accorded special deference in court is the presumption that unelected judges
suffer from a deficit of authority in the face of legitimately enacted democratic
legislation. 16 Yet not every judicial adventure into counter-majoritarian
territory is an indefensible usurpation, and quite a lot of thought has been
dedicated to defending judicial intervention in those situations when we have
17reason to believe that the democratic process has failed, or is likely to do so.
In the main, attention in this regard has focused on rights of political
participation, bars on discrimination against discrete and insular minorities, and
the other democratic-process paradigms of post-New Deal judicial review.
1 8
The central idea is that the courts are there to reinforce the structures of
representation-that blind majoritarianism is not always democratic, and
e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337-38 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision is the
pinnacle of our Eighth Amendment, death-is-different jurisprudence.... Seldom has an opinion of this
Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its Members.").
15. As a result of the Court's ruling in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), Texas amended its
death penalty procedure to allow the jury open-ended consideration of any relevant mitigating factors.
Act of Sept. 1, 1991, ch. 838, §1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 2898. That change had the effect of making the
Texas statute less "mandatory," at least on its face, by allowing the jury to vote for life even if they
found the defendant a future danger. In practice, however, the core of the standard remains the future
dangerousness special question, and it appears as an empirical matter to determine life and death. See
TEX. DEFENDER SERV., supra note 7, at 46 n.217 ("Research shows that 'while future dangerousness [is]
highly aggravating, lack of future dangerousness is only moderately mitigating,' which in part explains
the deadly consequences of this sentencing issue in Texas." (quoting Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation
and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1560 (1998))).
16. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (Yale Univ. Press 2d
ed. 1986) (1962) (introducing the famed "counter-majoritarian difficulty").
17. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
18. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938); Bruce A.
Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985) (arguing, like many, for more
expansive and functionalist understandings of Ely's concept of representation reinforcement); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes
of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279 (2005) (discussing process theory in the context of gay rights cases).
This is a small slice of an enormous literature-for indeed, Elysian approaches to judicial review have
long dominated the field.
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interventions are occasionally defensible to ensure the necessary preconditions
and proper functioning of the democratic system.1 9 Yet a few brave scholars
have suggested that more attention may actually be due to failings within the
process of lawmaking itself, and that judicial action might be a principled
response not only to the failures of democratic representation, but to the
20failures of democratic legislation-making as well. If this is so, then perhaps a
more stringent paradigm of review should apply to statutory language that was
never mentioned in any floor debate, and this research into Texas's legislative
process might thereby affect the subsequent judicial receptions of the
legislation.
This claim about failures of the lawmaking process reducing the need for
judicial deference seems quite plausible. If the basis of the "counter-
majoritarian difficulty" is the supposedly superior democratic authority of
legislatures over courts, we should expect the degree of the difficulty to vary
according to the underlying democratic legitimacy of the act of lawmaking in
question. If a legislature enacted a law while it was collectively drunk, or if a
large group of legislators believed they were voting for law X when they were
really voting for law Y, the foundations of Bickel's famous puzzle would no
longer seem so sturdy. In order for judicial review to suffer from a democratic
legitimacy problem, it must really be an act of democracy under the judicial
microscope. Thus, if the story of the Texas death penalty reveals sufficient
doubts about the democratic functioning of the state's representative bodies,
then perhaps judges will be justified in bringing a stricter form of scrutiny to
bear. If the contours of the original debate were sufficiently distorted-
whether such distortions were the fault of the legislators themselves or the
Supreme Court-then perhaps judges should look closer, and even send the
lawmakers back for their own fresh look.
But there is an enormous problem with this hope of a judicially mandated
do-over for the Texas death penalty scheme-namely, that the doctrine does
not work this way. However justified a reduction in judicial deference may be
in light of problems during the legislative process, this is simply not part of
judicial review as currently practiced. The use of legislative history in court at
19. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 18, at 1281 (describing Ely's project).
20. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 91-120 (1982)
[hereinafter CALABRESI, COMMON LAW]; Guido Calabresi, Foreword: Antidiscrimination and
Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 83
(1991) [hereinafter Calabresi, Antidiscrimination]; Dan Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration:
Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1575 (2001); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976); Richard
Neely, Obsolete Statutes, Structural Due Process, and the Power of Courts To Demand a Second
Legislative Look, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 271 (1982). The common thread among such scholarly positions-
epitomized by Judge Calabresi's view of "Type Ill judicial review," Calabresi, Antidiscrimination,
supra, at 86-is the notion that sometimes a law must be returned to the legislature for a second look so
that failures of the legislative process associated with the first try might be cured.
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all remains controversial, 21 and indeed, American doctrine contains some
heavy presumptions against even the most plausible forms of "looking behind"
a statute. 22 Remanding an otherwise constitutional bill to the legislature for
reconsideration in light of legislative process concerns is almost without
precedent, and it is certainly distant from the way that the courts currently
conduct their business. 23 Striking down a law for failures of "due process of
lawmaking" is an entertaining academic thought experiment but not a judicial
practice.
That said, doctrine is one thing and judicial psychology another-and
perhaps if judges know what lies behind the Texas death penalty the effect will
be the same. 24 Even if the language of everyday decisions does not speak in
terms of process-failings and democratic legitimacy, surely judges are
influenced by the realities of everyday life.
Even on the battlefield of judicial psychology, though, constitutional
litigation against the Texas death penalty presents an uphill battle. The future
dangerousness question has been in place for over thirty years, and bears
repeated stamps of judicial approval. And not only years lie in the wake of the
future dangerousness question-part of the reason that the Texas statute is so
important and entrenched is that it has condemned far more people to death
21. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 742-72 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing the "new textualism" and its
rejections of legislative history). Evidence suggests that textualism may be past its peak, but it still
exerts significant influence and continues to delegitimate introduction of legislative history. See Charles
Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REv. 205.
22. The rule of Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), is that the Court will not
review an enrolled statute signed by the President even to be certain that the bill signed by the President
was actually the one passed by Congress. See also United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 408-10
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (declining to look behind the enrolled bill to determine whether it had
originated in the House of Representatives as required by the Origination Clause, U.S. CONST. art I., §
7).
23. A handful of disparate examples might be assembled (for example, Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976)), but even their precedential value has been doubted. See ESKRIDGE ET AL.,
supra note 21, at 390-98. Interestingly, Furman itself might be considered such a form of judicial
remand, given that it sent the question of death-penalty procedure back to the states without announcing
a bright-line rule against the death penalty or specific incarnations thereof. Akhil Amar has supported
this interpretation. See Akhil Reed Amar, Concurring in Roe, Dissenting in Doe, in WHAT ROE V. WADE
SHOULD HAVE SAID 152, 157 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005).
24. The most highly parroted form of legal realism is the old saw that "law is only a matter of what
the judge had for breakfast." RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 36 (1986); see also Alex Kozinski,
What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 993
(1993). Without subscribing to such a reductionist view, it is obvious enough in this age that one can
impact judicial decision by invoking forms of argumentation not explicitly recognized by the doctrine.
See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); 2 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 5-7 (1960). For a generally nuanced discussion of both the social-
scientific and philosophical claims of legal realism, see Frederick Schauer, The Limited Domain of the
Law, 90 VA. L. REv. 1909 (2004).
25. Among many cases upholding the Texas scheme in multiple courts, the two most important are
clearly Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
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26than any other state death penalty statute. It would be quite the turnabout for
the state or federal judiciary to now say-after so many years and so many
executions-that it had really been mistaken about future dangerousness all this
time. Thus, even if certain judges were subjectively concerned with questions
of legislative process and secretly impressed by the evidence of process failings
in the case of the Texas death penalty, it would still be difficult to imagine the
judicial mind settling on the conclusion that the Texas statute needs a second
legislative look. We should not think it impossible, or wrong, that the
legislative story told here would have an impact on subsequent judicial
examination of the future dangerousness question.
Thankfully, though, it is not only the courts that ought to show concern
with the democratic legitimacy of past legislative enactments. Legislatures-
even very busy ones-should themselves be concerned, as should their
constituents. An enormous outpouring of scholarly work has focused on the
notion that popular institutions should be able to interpret the Constitution for
themselves and ought to receive some degree of deference when they do so.
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Yet to merit deference in their own acts of constitutional interpretation,
legislatures must show themselves to be attentive to constitutional concerns and
responsive to their constitutional duties of representation. They should also do
so to merit their constituency's respect. In short, a question of reputation is at
stake, and the opinions of both the reviewing judges and the voting public can
be eroded by evidence that important statutes rest on shaky acts of lawmaking.
Taking a fresh look at the flawed results of decisions long past could thus be
both a good public relations move and a powerful act of institutional self-
defense, be it a state or federal legislative reputation that is at stake. Given the
national prominence of the death penalty, and with popular attention ever
piqued by news stories28 and new legal developments, 29 conscientious
26. Justice Department statistics indicate that as of the end of 2004, Texas had executed 336
offenders-over 240 more than the next closest state and over one-third of the national total since 1977.
See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners Executed Under Civil Authority in the United States, by Year,
Region, and Jurisdiction (Jan. 18,. 2006), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/data/exest.csv. The Texas
Department of Criminal Justice maintains an on-line list of executed offenders together with hyperlinks
to their last statements. This site indicates that Texas has executed an additional 32 offenders in the 18
months since. See Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, Executed Offenders (Sept. 14, 2006),
http://www.tdcj .state.tx .us/stat/executedoffenders.htm.
27. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993); Robert
C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Anti-discrimination Legislation After
Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative
Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave
Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003). The idea is sometimes called "popular constitutionalism" or "legislative
constitutionalism," and the idea is essentially that certain popular and legislative decisions and
expressions of norms require deference in the interpretation of constitutional provisions by courts. See
generally I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2005); MARK TUSHNET,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2000).
28. See, e.g., Sarah Kershaw, Execution Ignites New Fire in Death Penalty Debate, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2005, at A30 (describing effects of Tookie Williams's execution); Maurice Possley & Steve
Yale Law & Policy Review
legislators have a great deal to gain in proving their attentiveness to the
legislative process associated with this particular question-whatever result is
reached in the end.30 This is to say that it need not be about the death penalty
itself; revisiting capital punishment in light of old process failings might merely
be a perfect vehicle through which the Texas Legislature can prove its mettle as
a democratic decision-maker.
And even if, in the end, this is just a story about the ordinary forms of
lawmaking that go into the making of the most extraordinarily important forms
of legislation, it contributes greatly to a healthy self-reflection on the state of
American democracy. The story of the Texas death penalty provides a kind of
counter-point to the remarkable process that produced the Civil Rights Act of
1964-the story with which the preeminent textbook on legislation currently
begins.3' In contrast to rare examples like the Civil Rights Act, America's most
lethal statute was born of a process full of serious structural flaws, and
whatever institutional response this finding generates, it should at least give us
pause and force us to question the underlying premises of our system of
government. Even if this is just a story about a Supreme Court decision and a
group of amateur lawmakers, it belongs among our paradigms for discussing
how state legislators do their jobs, how they interact with court decisions, and
how the democratic decisions affecting life or death issues are actually made.
Following this Introduction, this Note proceeds in four parts. Part I presents
a very brief history of the death penalty in the Supreme Court in order to
appropriately frame the background against which Texas legislators were
acting and against which their actions must be judged. Part II introduces the
future dangerousness standard as initially enacted and covers some of the most
serious problems associated with its interpretation and application. Part III tells
the legislative history behind the future dangerousness standard and attempts to
demonstrate some of the ways that distortions in the debates over the standard
affected the process and the final outcome. Part IV concludes with some
thoughts on the future of future dangerousness.
Mills, Did One Man Die for Another Man's Crimes?: The Secret that Wasn 't, CHI. TRIB., June 27, 2006,
at CI (describing evidence of innocence in the case of Carlos De Luna); 12 Years After Execution,
Evidence of Innocence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2005, at Al 8 (describing new evidence in the case of
Ruben Cantu).
29. The decision invalidating the death penalty for individuals under eighteen, for example, was a
lightning rod for public opinions about capital punishment and greatly increased the tenor of the public
debate. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
30. Cf Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN.
L. REv. 585 (1975) (discussing how conscientious legislators can attend to constitutional questions and
their constitutional duty to do so).
31. See ESKRIDGE ETAL., supra note 21, at 1-23.
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE SUPREME COURT
The Texas death penalty, like the death penalty generally, has spent a great
deal of time in court.32 Like all the other extant capital punishment provisions,
it was born from the ashes left by Furman v. Georgia,33 which invalidated the
death penalty as practiced in all states in 1972 and imposed a temporary
moratorium on its imposition. At the heart of the nine-voiced decision were the
opinions of Justices Stewart and White, who intimated a fear of the apparent
capriciousness of the death penalty and the sentencer's unfettered discretion.
34
State legislatures sought to respond to these concerns with new statutes, and the
execution chambers reopened in 1976 when the Court decided a set of cases on
these statutes enacted in Furman's aftermath.3 5 Three different discretionary
models were upheld in Georgia, Florida, and Texas, while the mandatory
models of North Carolina and Louisiana were struck down. The fate of Texas's
H.B. 200 was governed by Jurek v. Texas,36 a case that upheld the judgment of
future dangerousness as both within the jury's general competence 37 and broad
enough to allow jurors .an appropriate amount of discretion for mercy.38 The
Texas statute thus survived its first challenge in court precisely because it was
not mandatory. 39 Yet when the next major development came with Penry v.
Lynaugh in 1989, the Court determined that although the future dangerousness
question allowed the jury to consider some relevant mitigating factors, it
violated the Constitution by failing to explicitly allow consideration of other
essential mitigating factors at sentencing.40 The evolution of death penalty
doctrine thus displays a major conflict that generated enormous confusion in
the interregnum between Furman and Jurek: Discretion in death sentences
32. The Supreme Court alone has cited the Texas statute in nineteen different cases; the Fifth
Circuit has cited it in over 150. These numbers understate the point, as the Supreme Court has often
decided cases concerning the Texas death penalty without citing the statute itself. See, e.g., Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). For another measure, it appears that seventy-three separate Supreme
Court opinions have cited the opinion in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), initially upholding the
Texas scheme.
33. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
34. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310-11 (White, J.,
concurring).
35. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (striking down Louisiana scheme); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (striking down North Carolina scheme); Jurek, 428 U.S. 262
(upholding Texas scheme); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding Florida scheme); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding Georgia scheme).
36. 428 U.S. 262.
37. Id. at 274-76 (noting that judgments of future dangerousness are common and therefore within
the competence of the jury).
38. Id. at 272-73 (interpreting the future dangerousness question as one which allows
"consideration of particularized mitigating factors").
39. Id. at 271 (noting that Texas's scheme must be distinguished from North Carolina's mandatory
scheme in order to be upheld, as "[a] jury must be allowed to consider on the basis of all relevant
evidence not only why a death sentence should be imposed, but also why it should not be imposed").
40. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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appears to be an evil, but discretion-less schemes violate the Constitution as
well. The balance struck has been to privilege the discretion for mercy, while
tightly confining the discretion of jurors to vote for death.
All the judicial activity surrounding the death penalty-of which these
cases are only a tiny sample-has been plagued by some early sources of
interpretive dissonance. In 1971, in McGautha v. California, the Court held that
even a statute that gave the jury completely unfettered discretion to impose life
or death did not violate the Due Process Clause. 41 This ruling foreclosed future
death penalty decisions on due process grounds and shifted the debate to the
content of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual
punishments. 42 This development might not have been a problem, except that
the jurisprudence that emerged one year later in Furman turned out to be
heavily process-oriented.4 3 Thus, before the Furman moratorium even got off
the ground, it had to face the fact that the most plausible avenue for a
constitutional critique of death penalty procedure had already been blocked.
Perhaps for this reason, the Furman "decision" was a tangled morass of
disagreement, overlap, and general opacity. Each Justice authored his own
opinion, and what emerged was a 5-4 majority for the proposition seemingly
defeated in McGautha only the year before-namely, that existing death
penalty procedures were unconstitutional. 4 Not only was there no agreement
on what exactly caused the existing constitutional defects, but there was no
guidance offered by any Justice as to what might alleviate the current
constitutional shortcomings. All that seemed clear was that there was a
spectrum of opinion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas were
the most opposed to capital punishment, Justices White and Stewart were the
most ambivalent, and the four Justices appointed by President Nixon supported
the death penalty as it already stood. Legislatures which sought to reinstate
their death penalty statutes after Furman were thus essentially in the business
of courting Justices Stewart and White.
This posture gave rise to one of the big questions of Furman, which was
left unresolved and hotly debated by legislatures until the Court next took up
the death penalty in 1976-that is, mandatory death penalty schemes. Because
both Justices White and Stewart appeared to be concerned with unfettered jury
discretion and irregularity in the application of the penalty,45 many believed
41. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
43. Justice Stewart famously complained that the process by which some people got the death
penalty was too similar to "being struck by lightning." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (Stewart,
J., concurring).
44. Furman begins with a short statement of the facts and the order remanding for further
proceedings, and then proceeds to inform the reader that five Justices filed separate opinions in support
and four Justices filed separate dissents. Id. at 239-40.
45. See id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310-11 (White, J., concurring).
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that a statute that took all discretion out of the jury's hands would satisfy the
swing Justices. Mandatory death penalties seemed to be the easy way out.
This proved to be incorrect, though for an unexpected reason. Although
Justice White voted in favor of the mandatory schemes presented in Woodson
v. North Carolina46 and Roberts v. Louisiana,47 in 1976 Justice Powell changed
sides from Furman and opposed these mandatory schemes.4 8 Whatever the
difficulty in understanding how mandatory death penalty statutes failed to cure
Furman's complaint of excessive jury discretion-a paradox that fell to Justice
Stewart to explain 4 9-the first true bright-line rule emerged from the 1976
opinions: mandatory death penalty statutes would not stand. Furman had
resulted from an excess of some kind of discretion, but it had become clear that
it was not an excess of discretion for mercy that made the difference.
The question in Jurek was thus whether or not Texas had enacted a
mandatory death penalty scheme5°-a question finally answered in the negative
by Justice Stevens' plurality opinion.
5 1
This interpretation of Furman was further cemented by the 1989 ruling in
Penry v. Lynaugh,52 which held the Texas scheme unconstitutional because it
did not vest the jury with sufficient discretion to consider various mitigating
factors. Specific to that case was the issue of the defendant's mental
retardation, and whether the Texas system allowed for adequate consideration
thereof.53 The Court held that it did not. Penry made clear that those who had
advocated for a mandatory death penalty after Furman not only misinterpreted
the course that death penalty jurisprudence would chart, but were radically off-
base. After Penry, Furman stands for the principle that the jury must be tightly
46. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
47. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
48. Research indicates that the authority in all five cases coalesced around Powell, Stewart, and
Stevens, who replaced Justice Douglas after his stroke. Powell and Stewart realized that by combining
their forces, they could determine the outcome of every case, and Powell strongly believed that
"mandatory capital punishment was a step backward." JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,
JR. 425, 425-27 (2001). Most interestingly, it appears that the troika bargained among themselves in
what they believed to be the closest cases, Texas and Louisiana. It seems that Powell was able to trade
his vote against Louisiana's statute for Stevens' and Stewart's upholding of the Texas law. Id. at 427.
The principle that governed the three center Justices seems clear from behind the scenes: "Mandatory
death sentences would be forbidden, but discretionary capital punishment would be allowed, so long as
the states made some effort to articulate appropriate standards." Id.
49. See id. at 427 (noting that while squaring the Georgia, Florida, and Texas decisions with
Furman was relatively easy, defending the striking down of the mandatory schemes was "the greatest
challenge" because it was a "paradoxical[]" position).
50. 428 U.S. 262, 272 (1976) ("[T]he constitutionality of the Texas procedures turns on whether the
enumerated questions allow consideration of particularized mitigating factors.") (Stevens, J., plurality
opinion).
51. Id. at 273-74 (holding that, because a judgment of future dangerousness could incorporate a
wide variety of factors, the jury has discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in making its
sentencing determination).
52. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
53. Id.
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constrained in its ability to impose the death penalty, but widely free to
consider factors militating against the ultimate sanction. In short, subsequent
case law has shown that it was the exact opposite of the mandatory death
penalty that best cured Furman error.
This is noteworthy, because the idea of mandatory capital punishment
dominated and distorted the Texas death penalty debate. As will be seen, the
Texas House actually passed a mandatory bill, and numerous senators-many
of whom ended up on the decisive conference committee-believed that to be
the superior option. This means that the Texas Legislature was operating under
a strong misconception as to the meaning of Furman, leading to inevitable and
important distortions in the nature of the debate. Their misperception meant
that when they believed they were steering toward a constitutional safe harbor,
they were actually sailing out into dangerous waters. Future dangerousness was
designed as an all-but-mandatory form of capital punishment, and a
misunderstanding of Furman made it so.
In 1976, in Jurek, the Court held that the future dangerousness standard was
broad enough to allow the jury to make the required individualized assessment
of whether the crime merited life or death.54 Although that view was eroded by
Penry, it certainly remains strong.55 That said, the breadth of the future
dangerousness consideration is actually quite problematic, because its vague
language causes major difficulties of interpretation. As detailed in the next Part,
future dangerousness has been plagued from its inception by problems of
vagueness, and these have in turn yielded questions about whether expert
testimony on future behavior is consistent with the statute or appropriate in
court. This is to say that while the manifold possible meanings of future
dangerousness helped Texas to avoid the fate of North Carolina and Louisiana
in 1976, they also contributed to a subsequent history full of uncertain
meanings and questionable applications. It is to those problems of future
dangerousness that I now turn.
II. SOME DANGERS OF FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS
The problems of the future dangerousness standard are serious, manifold,
and too well-documented to merit extensive reprint here. 6 To frame the
discussion, however, it is important to understand a few of the most serious
54. 428 U.S. at 276.
55. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993) (holding that the future dangerousness question is
capacious enough to authorize the jury to consider the defendant's youth).
56. There have been literally hundreds of scholarly articles written on the problems of the future
dangerousness standard, many originating in the law-and-psychology community. For one basic
entrance into the contemporary literature, see Eugenia T. La Fontaine, Note, A Dangerous
Preoccupation with Future Danger: Why Expert Predictions of Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases
are Unconstitutional, 44 B.C. L. REV. 207 (2002).
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issues it has created. To that end, I will briefly discuss both interpretive and
practical problems. Before I do so, however, it is crucial to note that when H.B.
200 made future dangerousness one of the special questions-and essentially
still today-it was in practice the only question upon which turned the question
of life or death.
A. The Centrality of Future Dangerousness
For capital cases in Texas, H.B. 200 enacted the now-familiar "bifurcated
trial" system in which the jury first determines guilt or innocence and then
sentences after hearing additional evidence.57 Per its instructions, the guilt-
phase jury first determines whether or not the defendant committed a "capital
murder"--defined as a premeditated murder committed under certain specific,
factual conditions. The lines between capital and noncapital murder in Texas
are mostly objective, including, inter alia: (1) whether the victim was a police
officer; (2) whether the victim was a correctional officer; and most often (3)
whether the murder was committed during a kidnapping, robbery, or rape.58 As
H.B. 200 originally conceived it, if a capital murder was found, the jury moved
to a sentencing phase during which it would answer three "special questions."
59
If all were answered in the affirmative, the defendant was sentenced to death.
60
A brief examination of the questions shows, however, that only the "future
dangerousness" question provided any real chance of escape from the ultimate
sanction.
This is so because, of Texas's three original special questions, an
affirmative answer to two appears to be logically included in the guilty verdict
itself. As the statute stood in 1973, the questions were as follows:
(1) Whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death
of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased .
61
Clearly, a verdict of murder with malice aforethought would be unlikely-
capital case or not-if the jury believed that the murder was not unreasonable
in light of some provocation, or not even committed deliberately. The guilty
verdict thus logically contains a yes answer to both question (1) (on
57. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(a)(1) (Vernon 2006).
58. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 2003).
59. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.0711 (Vernon 2006).
60. See 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 426, art. 3, § 1.
61. Id.
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deliberateness) and question (3) (on provocation). 62 Indeed, today those two
questions no longer appear at all.63 In the hard core of cases, then, the future
dangerousness question determines the defendant's future.
B. The Uncertain Meaning of Future Dangerousness
With the future dangerousness question so central to the sentencing of the
capital defendant, it is especially troubling that no one knows exactly what it
asks. This is because it presents two enormous interpretive problems: the "what
future" problem, and the "a probability" problem.
The question of "whether ... the defendant would commit criminal acts" in
the future can only truly be answered with another question: "in what future
world should I, as a juror, consider this question?" The possible answers are
endless. Perhaps the jury is to consider whether the defendant will likely
commit any more crimes in the future, no matter where he ends up. This
plausible interpretation would make the question into a literal prediction of
future behavior. It seems a somewhat unlikely construction, however, because
the term "would" suggests the presence of an unspoken, logical predicate-of
something that would happen ifX were the case. Yet if we commit ourselves to
some manner of counterfactual inquiry, we open a Pandora's Box of
possibilities. Should the jury consider whether the defendant would likely
commit additional crimes if he were released today? Or should the jury perhaps
consider whether the defendant would likely commit additional crimes in
prison if sentenced to life instead of death? Should they factor in the likelihood
of parole, and at what date? These are hard interpretive questions-so hard, in
fact, that they have never been remotely settled by any Texas court.
64
62. Justice Blackmun made precisely this point in dissent in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 917
& n. 1 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("It appears that every person convicted of capital murder in
Texas will satisfy the other requirement[s] .... ).
63. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(b)(1) (Vernon 2006); see also supra note 16.
64. Although this "what future" question seemed to be presented in Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934
(Tex. Crim. App. 1975), the Texas courts did not answer it. They have ruled that the "a probability"
problem I discuss next does not render the statute vague, see, e.g., Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976), but they have treated the "what future" problem in only the most cursory and
unsatisfying way. See, e.g., Morris v. State, 940 S.W.2d 610, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ("[A] jury
considers not only free society, but also prison society."). At best, we know that the list of factors
enumerated by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Jurek appears to go as much to "badness" or culpability
as it does future dangerousness per se (for example, a young age may make one less culpable but more
dangerous, and it is treated as mitigating). See 522 S.W.2d at 940. We may thus infer that the court has
endorsed the "bad person" construction discussed below. Such inferences are unhelpful, however, in
determining whether, in the final analysis, certain forms of evidence such as expert predictions of future
behavior ought to be admissible. The "bad person" construction would ostensibly make these troubling
"factual" predictions irrelevant to the real nornative inquiry, but in fact courts continue to view the task
as at least partially predictive in the factual sense. For a fascinating account of the operation of this
"what future" problem in Virginia, another future dangerousness state, see Jessica M. Tanner,
"Continuing Threat" to Whom?: Risk Assessment in Virginia Capital Sentencing Hearings, 17 CAP.
DEF. J. 381, 391 (2005).
Vol. 25:143, 2006
Sudden Death
A hypothetical example might serve to concretize the importance of these
interpretive ambiguities. Consider the following case: Jim, age 35, is convicted
of capital murder. At sentencing, it is revealed that Jim has been to prison on
multiple occasions. Many of his convictions are for violent crimes.
Remarkably, however, Jim's record inside is spotless: he has never run afoul of
the authorities; he is a productive participant in jailhouse life; he takes classes
and works hard while incarcerated. The reason, it seems, is that Jim responds
very well to authority, but has a very hard time controlling himself in
unstructured, everyday life. In this example, because we know Jim has already
been convicted, we know most of his future lies in jail, where we can be
relatively certain that he will commit no future crimes. Whether Jim is "likely
to commit future acts of violence" is thus entirely dependent upon whether we
consider him inside or outside of his actual future environment-that is, jail.65
For Jim, the answer to the "what future" question colors all evidence presented
at his sentencing and perhaps means the difference between life and death.66
It might be argued that this problem is illusory because the future
dangerousness question has a certain "commonsense" or "core" meaning that
would not escape the lay juror forced to consider it.67 That meaning might be
something like the following: is this defendant the sort of person who if left to
her own devices would hurt or kill again-a bad person? One of the original
drafters of the standard, former state senator Jack Ogg, now seems to admit that
he imagined an inquiry along these lines.68 But this common-sense construction
is really a conflation of two distinct questions: the "bad actor" question, and the
"future dangerousness" question itself. It is simply and irrefutably true that not
all those likely to be future dangers are very bad actors, and vice versa. For
example, someone with a mental problem or prone to fits of uncontrollable rage
is ordinarily understood to be less culpable-less bad of an actor-even though
he or she may be much more "dangerous" than a one-time, cold-blooded killer.
The statutory phrasing is deeply ambiguous in such cases because this "core"
non-predictive view does not square with the question posed by the plain
language of the text.
And the ambiguities of the "what future" problem are only multiplied by
65. In 1973, Texas did not have an option for life without parole. Indeed, a proposal in the 63rd
Legislature by Senator D. Roy Harrington to add life without parole was killed in subcommittee. See
S.B. 7, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1973); see also BILL HISTORY FOR THE 63RD LEGISLATURE
(REGULAR SESSION) (1973). Life without parole was only added in 2005. See 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 787.
66. This hypothetical bears a close resemblance to Bible v. State, 162 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005). There, the defendant had a very good prison record earned while serving a previously imposed,
unrelated life sentence, but the court (and ostensibly the jury) did not see that fact as ultimately relevant.
Id. at 245-46.
67. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that "the
issues posed in the sentencing proceeding have a common-sense core of meaning" that juries should be
able to understand).
68. Telephone Interview with Jack Ogg, former Tex. State Senator (Sept. 14, 2005).
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the "a probability" problem. The second special question literally asks
"whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit violent acts"
in the future. 69 This offers no insight on how much of a probability is required
for an affirmative answer. The inherent confusion of this wording was cogently
summarized by Judge Odom of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
dissenting as to the first death sentence ever meted out under the aegis of H.B.
200:
What did the Legislature mean when it provided that man's life or death shall rest
upon whether there exists a "probability" that he will perform certain acts in the
future? Did it mean, as the words read, is there a probability, some probability, any
probability? We may say there is a twenty percent probability that it will rain
tomorrow, or a ten or five percent probability. Though this be a small probability,
yet it is some probability, a probability, and no one would say it is no probability or
not a probability. It has been written: "It is probable that many things will occur
contrary to probability," and "A thousand probabilities do not make one fact." The
statute does not require a particular degree of probability but only directs that some
probability need be found. The absence of a specification as to what degree of
probability is required is itself a vagueness inherent in the term as used in this issue.
Our common sense understanding of the term leaves the statute too vague to pass
constitutional muster.
70
Odom hits the nail on the head: not only is H.B. 200 ambiguous as to the
frame of reference for the future dangerousness prediction, it also offers
absolutely no guidance as to the level of certainty required for an answer of
"yes." We might consider 10% a reasonably high probability, but we might also
require 51% (i.e., more likely than not) or 95% (something like "beyond a
reasonable doubt"). As it stands, that question-like the "what future"
question-is left to the jury, and the evidence suggests that they are as confused
about it as everybody else.71
These interpretive ambiguities of the Texas death penalty are of special
significance to this project because the legislative history is ordinarily a good
place to turn to resolve them. In this case, however, the record is silent. In fact,
there is no record at all. Because not a word was spoken on future
dangerousness, there is no place to turn to resolve its original meaning. The
paucity of legislative thought on the standard has thus affected its precision in
two ways: it prevented the draftsmen from crafting clearer language, and, as we
will see, it keeps us today from ever filling the holes that their work has left.
69. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(b)(1) (Vernon 2005) (emphasis added).
70. Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934, 945 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (Odom, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
71. See Rad Sallee, The Death Penalty: Uneven Punishment in Local Courts Brings Calls for
Change in the Law, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 4, 1976. In this report, the jury asked for a dictionary to
help them settle the meaning of "probability." Denied by the judge, they sent the following note: "'There
is no probability that we will ever be able to answer' the question of Sierra's probable future behavior."




C. Practical Problems of Future Dangerousness
These abstract interpretive questions pale in importance next to the most
serious problem of future dangerousness in practice: predictions of future
behavior by prosecution psychologists. In most cases, the State calls an expert
witness-before his retirement, it frequently called a psychiatrist named James
Grigson (nicknamed "Dr. Death")-who testifies as to whether, in his "expert
medical opinion," the defendant is likely to commit future acts of violence.
72
These experts often testify without ever having interviewed the defendant or
using any information other than the prosecution's description of the crime.
73
Much has been written about the evident problems with this practice: scholars,
judges, psychologists, and activists alike declaim its unreliability, its prejudicial
effects, and its lack of a basis in scientific fact.74 And as for the draftsmen of
the future dangerousness standard, it is certainly not anything that they thought
about at the time.
75
The practice of having "experts" testify as to the future dangerousness of a
defendant has been tested before the Supreme Court and was upheld in
76Barefoot v. Estelle. The reasoning hinged on the fact that Jurek had upheld
the future dangerousness "prediction" as within the competence of the jury. If
an untrained jury could make a reasonable determination as to whether or not a
person would be a danger in the future, reasoned Justice White, then certainly a
trained psychologist could make at least an equal, if not a better, judgment. The
"expert" evidence was therefore deemed admissible.77
Yet this reasoning ignores the prejudicial effects of expert testimony, even
as to facts that we believe laymen are competent to judge. Consider the
following counter-example. We believe that the jury is the ultimate judge of
credibility, and we consider jurors capable of making determinations about
believability solely based on human intuition. We also recognize that certain
techniques, such as using lie-detector tests and sodium pentothal, can be more
72. Grigson was especially famous for his role. See Dan Rosenbaum, Travels with Dr. Death,
VANITY FAIR, May 1990, at 141.
73. Id. at 143.
74. See, e.g., Joseph J. Cocozza & Henry J. Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of
Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1976); Bruce J. Ennis &
Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62
CAL. L. REv. 693 (1974); Randy K. Otto, On the Ability of Mental Health Professionals To "Predict
Dangerousness ": A Commentary on Interpretations of the "Dangerousness " Literature, 18 L. &
PSYCH. REv. 43, 62-63 (1994) (summarizing research suggesting that predictions of future
dangerousness may be reliable approximately 50% of the time); Jonathan R. Sorensen & Rocky L.
Pilgrim, Criminology: An Actuarial Risk Assessment of Violence Posed by Capital Murder Defendants,
90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1251 (2000); Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133
U. PA. L. REv. 97 (1984); La Fontaine, supra note 56, at 233-36. This only scratches the surface of the
available literature across the law, psychiatry, and psychology fields.
75. See Telephone Interview with Jack Ogg, supra note 68.
76. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
77. Id. at 906.
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reliable than such intuition.78 Still, we do not admit lie-detector tests or allow
the use of sodium pentothal in court because we consider it enormously
prejudicial and inappropriate to take the determination of credibility out of the
jury's hands by appealing to technocratic expertise. The same prejudice inheres
in appealing to the expertise of a psychologist in this instance. And the
prejudice only increases when you have repeat players like Dr. Grigson, when
the evidence is that such predictions are unreliable, and when it is deceptive to
claim that this "expert medical opinion" has any claim to expertise at all.
The testimony of a witness like Dr. Grigson, cloaked in the mantle of
science and well-practiced through repeat play in the system, is all but
insurmountable for the average defendant. Judge Odom of the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals has decried it as "prejudicial beyond belief,' 79 and a later and
more quotable dissenter on the same court, Judge Teague, has described exactly
the repeat play "expert" problem that Dr. Grigson represents:
This is another case in which Dr. James P. Grigson, who has earned the
nickname "Dr. Death" because of the number of times he has testified on behalf of
the State . . . , testified.
After having read many records of capital murder cases in which Dr. Grigson
testified at the punishment stage of the trial, I have concluded that, as a general
proposition, when Dr. Grigson speaks to a lay jury, or an uninformed jury, about a
person who he characterizes as a "severe" sociopath, which a defendant who has
been convicted of capital murder always is in the eyes of Dr. Grigson, the defendant
should stop what he is then doing and commence writing out his last will and
testament-because he will in all probability soon be ordered by the trial judge to
suffer a premature death.
80
Clearly the transformation of the future dangerousness question into a
psychological issue represents an impossible barrier for defendants, because
they will always be up against well-practiced state "experts" who are adept at
speaking to juries and who can claim with impunity that they "have been
proven to be right in [their] prediction of individuals continuing to kill." 81 Even
78. One might dispute the reliability of these techniques, but suffice it to say that the scientific
pedigree of lie-detectors and truth-serum is much better than that of expert predictions of future
dangerousness. See Brief for Am. Psychiatric Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 12, id., 463 U.S. 880 (No. 82-
6080). As Justice Blackmun correctly noted in dissent, the APA's best estimate is that psychiatric
predictions of future behavior are wrong at least two out of every three times they are tried. Barefoot,
463 U.S. at 920 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also TEX. DEFENDER SERV., supra note 7. On polygraph
evidence and its relative reliability, see George M. Dery III, Mouse Hunting with an Elephant Gun: The
Supreme Court's Overkill in Upholding a Categorical Rejection to Polygraph Evidence in United States
v. Scheffer, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 227, 243-44 (1999); on sodium pentothal and other technological
methods of analyzing truthfulness, see LAWRENCE TAYLOR, SCIENTIFIC INTERROGATION: HYPNOSIS,
POLYGRAPHY, NARCOANALYSIS, VOICE STRESS AND PUPILLOMETRICS 303-12 (1984).
79. Bennett v. State, 766 S.W.2d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (Teague, J., dissenting) (citing
Smith v. State, withdrawn, 534 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (Odom, J., dissenting)).
80. Id. at 231-32.
81. Id. at 232 (citation omitted).
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Senator Ogg, an original drafter of the standard, now worries whether this
transformation prejudices defendants-especially indigent ones-because they
have little chance of securing an expert competent enough in court to refute the
likes of Dr. Grigson.8 2 If we believe Judge Teague, it seems to be the state's
expert who decides, in the great majority of cases, which defendants shall live
and which shall die.
All this would not be so disconcerting if there were a shred of scientific
basis for allowing expert testimony as to future dangerousness. There is none.
The American Psychiatric Association has discredited and disowned Dr.
Grigson because it is of the opinion that psychological experts simply cannot
predict future behavior with anything near the 100% accuracy that Grigson
claimed 3 -something it communicated to the Supreme Court in an amicus
brief in Barefoot.8 4 Predictions of future behavior are inherently unreliable,
with some success rates scientifically pegged at less than 33%.85 In fact, the
Texas Defender Service conducted a study to see how many of those deemed
future dangers-who, by definition, now reside on death row-went on to
perform acts of violence in prison. According to this data, despite the fact that
death row "future dangers" had nothing more to lose by committing another
crime, only 5% of them were documented as having committed serious assaults
while in prison.86 Thus it seems that predictions of future dangerousness are not
only inherently unreliable as a matter of scientific theory, but also empirically
unreliable as a matter of scientific fact. If we consider the question an actual
prediction, jurors and experts simply are not getting it right.
Of course, we do not know whether the question is supposed to be an actual
prediction or not, which brings me back to where I began. For not only does the
introduction of expert testimony create the problems and prejudicial effects that
I have just documented briefly, but it is also premised upon an interpretation of
the future dangerousness standard-that is, a quasi-scientific, predictive
interpretation-which is only one choice among many plausible views of its
ambiguous language. This means that all the problems that inhere in the
introduction of this "expert" testimony may be utterly divorced from the spirit
behind the original statute.
8 7
This brief discussion about the problematic transformation of the future
dangerousness standard into a question for psychological experts is relevant to
our inquiry for two reasons. The first is that it shows that all is not well with the
82. Telephone Interview with Jack Ogg, supra note 68.
83. Laura Beil, Groups Expel Texas Psychiatrist Known for Murder Cases, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, July 26, 1995, at 21A.
84. See Brief for the Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, supra note 78.
85. See id. at 14, 22.
86. TEXAS DEFENDER SERV., supra note 7, at 23.
87. See infra Part Il1.
Yale Law & Policy Review
Texas death penalty. But the expert-ization of future dangerousness also lays
bare a second, slightly more nuanced problem more directly related to the
troubled legislative history I discuss next-the problem of "deliberateness" and
democratic legitimacy. It seems fair to say that the closer the implementation of
a statute is to what the legislature intended, the more legitimate it is from a
democratic point of view. In other words, if the legislature anticipated and
sought to validate psychological testimony of this kind, we might feel less
concerned about it. We might even abide it as an unintended and unfortunate
side-effect of a deliberate and well-deliberated policy choice if there were
evidence that future dangerousness was a standard that really mattered to
Texans or to their representatives. In short, a claim that future dangerousness
had deep democratic roots would make the problems it creates somewhat easier
to accept.
The evidence I discuss next suggests, however, that the future
dangerousness standard cannot make such a claim. First of all, there is no
evidence to suggest that the second special question was intended to be one for
psychological experts, or that the legislature ever imagined the psychological
adventure that the sentencing phase of the contemporary Texas capital trial has
become. Second, no deference is due for "deliberateness" because future
dangerousness was hardly deliberated at all. In democratic terms, Dr. Death's
dubious testimony is a phenomenon that traces back to little more than a single
day in May when seven conferees decided that the future dangerousness
question could resolve their differences over which of Texas's two proposed
death penalty bills might-in the words of one-"pass constitutional
mustard." 88
III. ONE DAY IN MAY-A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The legislative history of the future dangerousness standard can be
summarized as follows. Beginning in January 1973, committees and
subcommittees began hearing testimony and thinking about a new death
penalty in Texas. On May 10th, the House gave its best interpretation of
Furman and passed a mandatory death penalty bill. Two weeks later, the Senate
debated between that mandatory bill and a more discretionary approach, finally
opting for the latter. With only Memorial Day weekend to go before
adjournment, the House called a conference committee to resolve the
differences between the two bills. On the very last day, the conferees presented
a scheme which appeared in neither the House nor the Senate bill, along with
newly minted language about "a probability" that the defendant would be a
"continuing threat." That same day, both houses passed the committee report
88. Telephone Interview with Jack Ogg, supra note 68.
Vol. 25:143, 2006
Sudden Death
by huge margins without specifically considering the new language on future
dangerousness. Out of this hurried and somewhat confused process were born
all of the problems just recounted.
A. The Call to Action
There is little question that the majority of Texans wanted the death penalty
reinstated after Furman. Indeed, as early as September 1972, at least one
legislator was calling on the Governor to open a special legislative session for
consideration of a new death penalty statute89-a request that Governor Preston
Smith honored a few weeks later.90 Although no consensus was reached by the
end of the special legislative session, it was not for lack of a popular mandate,
or for lack of trying. In fact, the Senate managed to pass a new death penalty
bill within a few short days,9 1 although it failed to achieve the four-fifths
majority necessary to suspend the rules and fully pass it in time. 92 Furthermore,
there is every indication that the public wanted such immediate action. Many
called for reinstatement of the death penalty after Furman, and many articles
cited, with apparent approval, the actions of other states and foreign
jurisdictions in passing new laws and carrying out new executions. 93 Moreover,
it appears from the record of the House debate that questionnaires on the death
penalty had been circulated to local constituencies in Texas. The returns
favored re-imposition by a huge margin and the legislators knew it.94 The
people of Texas were clamoring against Furman from very early on, and the
legislature was listening and responding.
Meanwhile, Furman had been less than clear on what changes would be
required to make the death penalty constitutional. Each Justice authored a
separate opinion and thus offered little collective guidance for fixing the death
penalty as it stood. Marshall and Brennan made it plain enough that they
89. New Law Sought on Death Penalty, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sep. 28, 1972.
90. Art Wiese, Special Session Asked To Study Death Penalty, HOUSTON POST, Oct. 13, 1972.
91. Jon Ford, Death Penalty Tentatively Restored, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS, Oct. 17, 1972.
92. Governor Praises Session, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sep. 18, 1972, at A4.
93. See, e.g., Another Execution?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 20, 1972, at D2 (editorializing
against Furman and asserting that the fall of the death penalty would lead to increased violent crime);
Carter Revives Death Penalty, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, March 31, 1973, at A6 (noting with apparent
approval the restoration of a death penalty in Georgia); City Council Urges Capital Punishment,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 11, 1972, at DI; Death Penalty Returns, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May
5, 1973, at A4 (noting with apparent approval the enactment of a mandatory death penalty in
Connecticut and Nevada); Terry Kliewer, Tower Raps End to Death Penalty, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
July 11, 1972, at A10 (noting the opposition of a U.S. Senator to Furman); Oklahoma OKs Death
Penalty, DALLAS NEWS, May 12, 1973, at A18 (noting with apparent approval the enactment of a
mandatory death penalty in Oklahoma).
94. Transcript of Floor Proceedings on H.B. 200, Texas House of Representatives (May 8, 1973)
(on file with author) [hereinafter House Transcript] (citing questionnaires showing 80% popular support
for the death penalty).
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believed the death penalty was per se unconstitutional,95 and while Douglas'
opinion on racial disparities stopped short of announcing a per se rule, it was
clear that his vote would be the next hardest to get. 96 Stewart and White voted
with those three to declare existing statutes unconstitutional, but based their
opinions on the "wanton" and "freakish[]" imposition of the death penalty,
97
and on the failure of judges and juries to impose the sentence with any
regularity. 98 Their opinions, however, had little to say as to how their
complaints about discretion might be answered. On the other side, Burger,
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist would not have struck down the death
penalty. 99 Blackmun took pains to point out, though, that one perceived
solution to unfettered discretion-a mandatory death penalty-might, for him,
create a constitutional problem rather than solve one. 1° ° State legislatures were
thus forced to count noses and interpret a nine-voiced court in an attempt to
gauge what, if anything, could make a capital punishment statute
constitutionally acceptable.
These two conditions-overwhelming popular support and some
constitutional uncertainty--drove the Texas death penalty debate. In honoring
the voters' demands, legislators had to be careful about crossing constitutional
lines, but it was no easy task to discover where those lines actually were.
Legislators had to search carefully through the Furman opinions for a form of
death penalty that a majority of the Court could support, worrying whether the
steps they were taking were toward the lines, away from them, parallel to them,
or over them entirely. In the House, the lines were accidentally crossed.
B. The House's Unconstitutional Proposal
At its inception, H.B. 200 was an unconstitutional, mandatory death penalty
scheme. We know now that the Court would have struck down H.B. 200, as it
invalidated similar laws in North Carolina and Louisiana when it next took up
the question of capital punishment.'0 1 Yet this was far from clear at the time. In
fact, the vote against the mandatory death penalty in those subsequent cases
was a narrow 5-4 split, with both Justices White and Powell switching sides
95. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 305 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 371
(Marshall, J., concurring).
96. See id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that even a mandatory death penalty may not
prevent unconstitutional discrimination).
97. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment)
98. See id. at 310-11 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
99. See id. at 375-470 (writing separately to dissent from the majority).
100. See id. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (fearing the mandatory legislation that states might
pass to comport with the White and Stewart opinions). It should be noted, however, that Blackmun did
not end up voting against the mandatory death penalty in either Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 307-08 (1976), or Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 363 (1976). It was, instead, Justice Powell
who changed sides.
101. See Woodson, 428 U.S. 280; Roberts, 428 U.S. 325.
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from the positions they took in Furman. Like lawmakers around the country,
Texas legislators were under the impression that Furman error resulted from an
excess of discretion in the process, and thus, to avoid a death penalty that was
like "being struck by lightning," 10 2 they attempted to make the outcome more
regular and certain. It was an honest mistake for which they bore no blame, but
it was nonetheless a foundational misconception upon which the entire H.B.
200 debate was built.
In fact, the belief that a mandatory death penalty was the best way to cure
Furman error was so pervasive that the House appears to have only considered
mandatory bills. The two options that were the focus of hours and hours of
committee mark-ups, public hearings, and floor debates appear to have differed
only in the types of murder for which the mandatory death penalty could be
assessed. When Representative Dean Cobb first submitted H.B. 200, it allowed
the death penalty for many kinds of murder, whereas Representative Frank
Lombardino's proposal, House Bill 229, applied only to killings of police
officers and firefighters. 0 3 Though the House Committee on Criminal
Jurisprudence worked toward a compromise between Cobb's breadth and
Lombardino's narrow approach, it does not appear to have considered any
proposal which would have allowed the sentencer-be it judge or jury-to
weigh individual factors before affirmatively voting for life or death. That is
because, in Cobb's own words, it was "felt that a statute prescribing mandatory
penalties of death.., would be in line with [Furman] and would withstand
constitutional attack."1 4
Two constitutional misconceptions held by Texas lawmakers have thus
already emerged: (1) the worry that only narrow classes of murders could
constitutionally warrant the death penalty; 10 5 and (2) the belief that only a
mandatory death penalty could constitutionally sentence the perpetrators of
those murders to death. These misconceptions were, of course, quite
understandable in light of the confusion of the time-for which Furman's nine
different opinions are largely responsible. Indeed, given the difficulty of
assembling majorities for any prospective proposition in Furman, the Texas
House should be applauded for working hard to meet the concerns of the
Constitution. But they nonetheless made mistakes in locating the constitutional
lines, and those errors importantly prevented lawmakers from voting and acting
102. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring)
103. Mary Lenz, Panel To Study Punishment Bills, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 21, 1973, at D4.
104. COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE, 63d Cong., 1st Sess, at I (Tex. 1973).
105. Although the Texas House expressed great concern that making all felony murders death-
eligible would render the statute unconstitutional, the Supreme Court has in fact placed little to no
emphasis on narrowing the scope of eligible murders, and certainly has not barred the death penalty for
felony murders generally. See, e.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding a statute
imposing the death penalty for any first degree murder). Only some non-murders, such as aggravated
rape, have been rendered ineligible. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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as they otherwise might have.
Indeed, the legislators were quite explicit about the way that their concerns
with the Supreme Court altered their behavior. Representative Doyle had this to
say about H.B. 200 before amendments were to be offered expanding the range
of covered crimes:
I agree that the bill is not exactly as I wish-the bill is not exactly as anybody
wishes, but we're not concerned primarily with what we want in this bill, we're
concerned with an attempt to draft a death penalty statute which has some hope of
being held constitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States. And that is
how we drew the bill.
10 6
Thus, not only had the House somewhat misinterpreted the constitutional
lines, but they also let those misperceived lines shape the debate. As Doyle
points out, meeting the demands of the Constitution was undoubtedly their
chief priority-so much so that many of their other policy concerns might have
been sacrificed to that end. In short, the mandatory bill passed by the House
was not the bill they thought "best" in any political or moral sense, it was only
the bill they thought was most likely to satisfy five Justices of the Court.
In sum, then, it is clear that the House was doing neither of the two things
we would hope for a legislature: (1) attending to policy preferences; or (2)
attending to the actual demands of the Constitution. The House was
undoubtedly trying to do the latter-so much so that it became nearly
impossible for its members to do the former-but the confusion surrounding
Furman led them to believe, wrongly, that a mandatory death penalty was the
only way to do so. Thus, even in their strong attempt to follow the strictures of
the Court, they were going somewhat astray. It was by no means their fault, for
they had the unenviable position of trying to cook up a solution with nine chefs
each offering a recipe for the soup. When we look back today, it is important to
understand that this misperception about mandatory death was among the most
important sources of the specific capital procedures that emerged. In this way,
the confusion surrounding Furman served to substantially undermine both the
quality of the H.B. 200 debate and the content of its product.
C. Justice v. Discretion-The Senate Fix
The Senate saved the Texas death penalty from another defeat in
Washington by substituting the House's mandatory bill with a more
discretionary one. Yet even there, a core group of supporters advanced the
mandatory model, not as the ideal policy choice, but as the most
constitutionally sound solution. A confrontation arose between Senators Adams
and Meier: the former trumpeted the mandatory death penalty because of an
outsized fear of discretion born of the White and Stewart opinions; the latter
106. House Transcript, supra note 94, at 21 (emphasis added).
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advocated jury sentencing after a weighing of aggravating and mitigating
factors because of his astute analysis of the Blackmun opinion. They faced off
with Adams as the defender of the Constitution and Meier as the defender of, in
his own words, "justice," even though it was in fact Meier who had the
constitutional question right. And although Meier-one of Texas Monthly's
"top ten" legislatorsl°7-ended up being able to persuade the Senate to vote
with him, this debate shows precisely the ways in which the legislators'
constitutional confusion prevented them from fully reaching the deep moral
issues that could have been at stake in an ideal debate about ideal capital
punishment policies.
The Senate debate was a choice between two bills: the House's mandatory
bill introduced by Senator Ogg;10 8 and a Model Penal Code-style bill
introduced by Senator Meier.10 9 The Senate Jurisprudence Committee, of which
both Ogg and Meier were members, decided that they would not choose
between these bills themselves, but would instead report both bills out of
committee and allow the Senate as a whole to determine which one was more
likely to satisfy the Court.'
10
Satisfying the Court was by far the dominant concern. Even at the
committee level, "[m]ost of the debate was concentrated on legal ramifications
rather than moral arguments, as both Meier and Ogg touted their respective
proposals as the most likely to meet constitutional guidelines." ' When
Senator Ogg defended his bill to the press, he went directly to the constitutional
point: "On paper, I guess it does sound cold.., but what we're trying to do
here is meet constitutional muster. I'm not arguing the conscious [sic] part of it,
I'm arguing the constitutional part."' 12 From the committee level on, Ogg
would push his argument that the House's mandatory proposal was the most
likely to survive without ever confronting the plain moral and policy problems
associated with a "cold" and mandatory death penalty.
It was thus Ogg who started the Senate floor debate by introducing the
mandatory death penalty as the clear constitutional answer. He first offered his
analysis of Furman:
I think the thread running through the Furman case, all the way through it, was that
in the past when there has been defendants tried in like or similar situations and in
too many instances there is a wide range of punishment given and those who are of
minority classes, either economically or socially, have been afforded the death
penalty when other people in the same or similar circumstances have not and that it
107. The Ten Best And, Sigh, the Ten Worst Legislators, TEX. MONTHLY, July 1973, at 34, 37.
108. S.B. 20, 63d Leg. (Tex. 1973).
109. S.B. 10 (Comm. Substitute), 63d Leg. (Tex. 1973).
110. See Transcript of Floor Proceedings on Death Penalty, Texas Senate 2-5 (May 23, 1973) (on
file with author) [hereinafter: Senate Transcript].
11I. Senate Bill Gives Option to Judge on Death Penalty, DALLAS TIMES HERALD, May it, 1973.
112. Id.
Yale Law & Policy Review
was the great variance in penalties that the Court was speaking to in the Furman
case .... And the Court said-it talked about discrepancy. Two of the Justices who
voted with the prevailing side against the present death penalty said that they would
only-or indicated that they would only vote for a death penalty if it were
mandatory. 113
This was met immediately with a prescient question from the Senate floor,
pressed by Senator Meier: "[Does] any one of the Justices feel insured, or
Justice White, whom you [are talking] about say anything about accepting a
death penalty if it is mandatory because I don't read that into the decision?"
'' 14
A dispute followed between Senators Meier and Ogg over whether a mandatory
death penalty would pick up the necessary fifth vote given the fact that
although it might appeal to White and Stewart, it would risk alienating
Blackmun and Burger. 115 The Senate was clearly engaged in a much more
nuanced discussion of Furman's dictates than was the House.
Yet Meier's response to Ogg sounded in two distinct registers:
constitutional and moral. Meier led with his constitutional rhetoric, suggesting
that a mandatory death penalty had little chance of success with the Court:
[I]f you vote to require a mandatory penalty in the face of these words by the
Justices of the Supreme Court [Blackmun and Burger], you are just ignoring what
they are saying and you are just doing nothing more than putting a statute on the
books that is going to be held unconstitutional the first opportunity that comes up to
the Court.16
Next, however, a biting assault by Senator Adams on the "discretion" in
this model forced Meier to make a more moral, or policy-oriented, argument.
The exchange is extremely illuminating, especially as to what is absent from
the rest of the debate:
ADAMS: Senator Meier, now as I understand the way you have explained your bill,
after the merits of the crime have been decided and the defendant is found guilty of
those merits, then at that point, the judge or jury in an advisory capacity will make a
determination as to punishment either by death or by term imprisonment, or by life.
Is that correct?
MEIER: Life imprisonment.
ADAMS: Now what do you call that, Senator? Discretion.
MEIER: I call that justice.
ADAMS: You call that discretion, don't you, Senator?
MEIER: What I call that is justice. What I call this is not putting a man in a
situation where the trial lawyer can lean over the bench and point to the jury and
say, "And ladies and gentlemen of the jury, if you have a reasonable doubt in your
mind and you find this man guilty, he is going to get the electric chair period.
113. Senate Transcript, supra note 110, at 3.
114. Id. at4.




ADAMS: You call that discretion, do you not, Senator?
MEIER: I call that justice, Senator, is what I call it.
ADAMS: Well, why did you call it discretion a while ago?
MEIER: I said that in approaching this problem-
ADAMS: They had discretion.
MEIER: They had an opportunity to balance factors.
ADAMS: And exercise discretion in punishment, do they not?
MEIER: They have the-
ADAMS: Come on, Senator, say it. It won't hurt.
MEIER: The have discretion to the limited-
ADAMS: That's right, they have discretion.
1 17
This is by far the most passionate and policy-oriented exchange of the
entire debate. But then, it was only Meier who was making a policy point-
arguing that mandatory death might be unjust, constitutional or not. Adams,
meanwhile, was hewing closely to his (again, misperceived) constitutional
course. It was thus not much of a policy "exchange" at all.
Hence, even though Meier won in the end,1 18 the Senate debate shows just
what the House debate showed: the shaping of the conversation by a
misperceived constitutional cure-the mandatory death penalty-which was
both ultimately unconstitutional and perhaps not the preferred policy of any of
the relevant legislators. Again, it is in principle a good thing for senators to care
about the constitutionality of their choices, for it is the duty of legislators to try
to uphold the Constitution. In this case, however, confusion for which they
could not be blamed was causing them to push an unconstitutional solution
under this banner, and thereby ignore their policy intuitions as to what was
"cold" and what was "just". Thus, although Meier's more discretionary,
substitute proposal carried the day, it did so without another word of discussion
on its relative justice as compared with mandatory death. Perhaps such a
discussion is not required, but it is part of the democratic ideal, and in a context
as pregnant with meaning as the death penalty, such concerns of justice are at
the very least conspicuous in their absence.
Also conspicuously absent up to this point in the debate was future
dangerousness. With only one business day to go in the legislative session, it
was still wholly absent from the record and from the legislators' minds.
117. Id. at 12-13.
118. Meier carried the day when Ogg's bill was tabled by a vote of 20-9. See id. at 16-17.
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D. The Mysterious Birth of Future Dangerousness
An unrecorded conference committee produced the future dangerousness
standard on May 27, 1973, and for that reason, its emergence is shrouded in
mystery. All we can know about it must be inferred from news reports, the
composition of the committee, and the recollections of the one living Senator
who agreed to discuss it. Given how little time and debate went into the issue,
however, it is quite possible that we know all there is to know about what the
future dangerousness question was originally intended to ask. That is to say, no
one legislator had a more robust understanding then than we do now.
One thing we do know is that the overwhelming majority of committee
members originally favored a mandatory scheme. The House rejected the
Senate's nonmandatory bill by an enormous majority,11 9 and a ten-man
conference committee was appointed to resolve the differences. Two members
of that committee, however, Senator James Wallace and Representative Craig
Washington, opposed the death penalty and refused to sign the conference
committee report in an apparent protest.1 20 Senator Max Sherman's signature
was also absent, as he was not interested in any scheme in which the jury did
not "squarely face" the responsibility of sentencing the defendant. 12 1 That
eliminated two of the Senate's five representatives. Of the remaining three, two
had been the chief advocates for the House's mandatory approach on the Senate
floor: Adams and Ogg. The latter had even reiterated his support for a
mandatory scheme in the press on the morning of the first committee
meeting. 122 That left only Meier for his nonmandatory scheme-initially
trailing six-to-one.
Public opinion seems to have been behind the constitutional prospects of
the mandatory death penalty as well. The Dallas Morning News, one of the
state's most prominent papers, delivered this exhortation under the headline:
"Make It Straight Death:" "If the Senate keeps its eye on the main
consideration-getting a law acceptable to the high court-it will vote with the
House to impose death in all cases of conviction." 123 In contrast, the Dallas
Times Herald, after calling the Meier bill more "civilized," offered the
following tepid endorsement of the Senate plan: "The House, we think, might
just as well adopt the Senate approach and see what happens, Constitutionally
119. Death Penalty Bill Goes to Conferees, HOUSTON CHRON., May 25, 1973.
120. Compare Death Penalty Joint Panel Fails To Reach Compromise, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN,
May 26, 1973 (listing Washington and Wallace on conference committee), with CONFERENCE
COMMrITEE REPORT ON H.B. 200, 63D LEG. (Tex. 1973) (on file with author) (signatures absent).
121. Lawmakers Reinstate Death for Five Types of Murder, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 29,
1973. Sherman apparently objected to the fact that the judge would impose the sentence, even if he was
bound to follow the command of the jury's verdict. See id
122. In Search of a Formula, DALLAS TIMES HERALD, May 25, 1973.
123. Make It Straight Death, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 16, 1973.
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speaking." 124 The implication is relatively clear: The mandatory death penalty
was regarded as the safe bet, even if there were reasons to prefer the public
policy decisions embodied in the Meier bill.
Starting from this six-to-one split, the conference committee failed to reach
a compromise at its first meeting. A number of the members, it seems, were
holding out for mandatory death-especially the House delegation., 25 On
Saturday morning, the American Statesman reported that the previous night's
attempt at negotiations had stymied, with nothing more resolved than to meet
again the next day to discuss three drafts: one mandatory, one with jury
sentencing, and one with the jury providing only an advisory opinion.1
26
The committee's next meeting seemed to produce a compromise, though it
was more an act of technical legislative savvy than an agreement on substance.
The idea originated with Meier. He suggested that the bill make the death
penalty mandatory, but allow "exceptions" in certain circumstances. The bill
would then include a severability clause which would allow the Court to strike
down the exceptions clauses if they were unconstitutional while still leaving
intact the mandatory punishment scheme. 127 Meier left the Saturday afternoon
meeting confident that he had found the constitutional solution.'
28
Though this compromise would be replaced by the special questions
scheme late Sunday night, the latter model was already emerging. What had
vanished was the ability of the jury to impose life rather than death based on a
"weighing" of various factors. What filled the place of this discretion were a
few "exceptions" which, if found, would necessarily save the defendant and
which, if not found, would necessarily condemn him. The shape of this
compromise is thus strongly similar to the shape of the special questions
scheme which eventually emerged, as both equate the finding of certain
conditions with certain death. And, importantly, this shape is conceptualized by
the committee as more or less a mandatory death penalty scheme. The
procedure that Ogg had called "cold" was quickly becoming an icy reality.
In the end, though, it was not Senator Meier but Dallas Representative
Robert Maloney who authored the final compromise, complete with its three
special questions.129 Agreement on the special questions model was reached, in
principle, late on Sunday night when the committee met for the third time, but
the final language for the questions was not cemented until a last meeting at
10:15 on Monday morning, the last day of the legislative session. Indeed, on
124. In Search of a Formula, supra note 122.
125. Compromise Reached on Death Penalty Bill, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 28, 1973, at A8.
126. Death Penalty Joint Panel Fails To Reach Compromise, supra note 120, at 5.
127. Compromise Bill Sought To Legalize Death Penalty, HOUSTON CHRON., May 27, 1973.
128. Id.
129. See Panel Okays Death Bill With Life Sentence Option, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, May 28,
1973.
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Monday morning the American Statesman reported that there were four
questions in the bill-the additional one being whether or not the defendant's
act was performed with the reasonable expectation that a death or injury would
result. 30 Time pressure was especially intense at this point-with the key
deliberations on the language of the questions taking place the morning of the
final votes-but it had been pressing down on the legislature for many weeks.
By Monday morning, the clock had clearly run out.
Representative Maloney, who forged the last-minute compromise, had
supported the mandatory death penalty from the start131-which leads one to
believe that the final product was intended to lean heavily to that side. As
Senator Ogg remembers it, Meier had worked throughout the process to
convince him that some discretion had to be built into the process, and then the
two of them had tried to convince Maloney of the same. 132 Still, according to
the Houston Post, "Maloney and the other conferees hoped such a system
would permit such a small degree of jury discretion that the U.S. Supreme
Court would uphold its legality."'133 Under the pressure of the final bell, it
appears that the compromise that was reached strongly incorporated the
House's insistence that the jury be limited in its capacity for mercy. Meier did
convince the others to abandon the mandatory death penalty, but perhaps not by
much.
Indeed, looking at the final compromise as a whole, H.B. 200 looks more
and more like a mandatory death penalty bill. As has been said, its two other
questions-the "deliberateness" question and the "provocation" question-are
all but logically contained within the guilty verdict itself. One gets the
impression that the future dangerousness question was intended as a rarely
applicable safety valve as well-as a way that the extraordinarily sympathetic
killer might be spared rather than the method through which the extraordinarily
evil murderer would be condemned. Ogg seems to recall understanding the
statute this way at the time. 134 And, in fact, an initial report on the operation of
the new statute which appeared in the Houston Post in 1976 noted that "[o]ver
half of capital murder cases [were] destined for death row," with 70% of
convictions earning the death penalty. 135 Perhaps by design and certainly in
effect, the future dangerousness question condemned the ordinary capital
murderer rather than only the worst of the worst.
In one weekend, then, six-to-one for mandatory death became seven votes
130. Id.
131. See House Transcript, supra note 94, at 54-55 (offering an amendment to add crimes for
which the mandatory death penalty would be available).
132. Telephone Interview with Jack Ogg, supra note 68.
133. Penalty 'Solution' Offered, HOUSTON POST, May 28, 1973 (emphasis added).
134. Telephone Interview with Jack Ogg, supra note 68.




for a limitedly discretionary scheme in which a capital sentence could be
avoided only if the jury found that the defendant would not be a future danger.
The conferees were hoping that this would present "such a small degree of jury
discretion" that the Supreme Court would uphold it, and indeed, the Court
would later do so. But though they had the Court in mind, their neigh-
mandatory compromise was not ultimately organized around the correct
constitutional principle. Subsequent case law would clarify that the Court had
hoped to limit the discretion of juries to impose the death penalty, not their
discretion to grant mercy. 136 The conferees could not have known it, but in
choosing to remain very close to a mandatory death penalty, they did not avoid
the constitutional lines but came very close to crossing them. Future
dangerousness was thus the product of a flawed process that both enacted a
constitutional misperception (the need for a near-mandatory scheme) and, at the
same time, crowded out a healthy policy debate about just what kind of scheme
would be the most preferred and the most just.
E. Final Passage
Even with the brand-new future dangerousness language, the conference
committee's proposal sailed through both houses. The combined pressures of
time and massive support for the death penalty prevented either chamber from
debating the compromise with any real purpose. The effect of the conference
committee's decision to add new language never before debated was thus to
transform themselves into a seven-person state legislature, for it was impossible
for either house to alter the bill without dooming it and unlikely that either
would vote to kill it. Future dangerousness thus became law without a word.
Both houses rapidly ratified the committee report, and though it was at least
the object of minor attention in the House, neither chamber discussed the new
language on future dangerousness. The Senate rubber-stamped the measure,
"expend[ing] not one word of debate," and voting in favor of it by a margin of
27-4. 137 House adoption similarly came as a matter of course, although
objections by Representatives Spurlock and Washington served to bring into
focus the extent to which the conference committee had elided the ordinary role
of the legislature in forging statutory solutions. Spurlock decried the fact that
the mandatory death penalty had been abandoned,138 calling for a new
conference committee. 139 His argument suggests the extent to which last-
minute ground-breaking by the conference committee had obviated all the prior
work of the House and Senate. Washington made the point even more
136. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
137. Solons Vote To Restore Death Penalty in Some Cases, HOUSTON CHRON., May 29, 1973.
138. See id.
139. See 1973 TEX. H.R. JOUR. 4985.
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emphatically, raising a point of order against the conference report because of
its new language. 140 When the chair overruled him, he led a last-ditch effort
against the death penalty's reinstatement. He quickly failed, and the Maloney
model was approved 114-30. 141
The entire structure of the Texas death penalty thus owes its existence in
part to Bill Meier and in a larger part to Robert Maloney, who creatively
constructed the eleventh-hour compromise out of new, unprecedented
language. Though there were hours of debate in the House and Senate over the
form of capital punishment that might best satisfy the Constitution, those
debates bear little if at all on the language that the conference committee
eventually produced. The legislature does not appear to have had a considered
view on how future dangerousness would work in practice, or really, to have
thought about it at all, because as a body, they never really had a chance to
think about it.
The many process flaws this analysis has illuminated are important, even if
they are hallmarks of ordinary state legislation. All of the rushing, the mistakes
of constitutional law, the lack of extended policy discussion, and the enormous
power wielded by the conference committee are run-of-the-mill problems with
state legislative work. Yet that does not make it unproblematic, especially here.
The courts have recognized that there is something special about the death
penalty, both because of the awesome finality of the sentence and the capacity
of capital punishment to express community norms. H.B. 200 was not an
omnibus spending bill or pork-barrel legislation affecting narrow interests in
small Texas counties. Instead, it is thought that the legislative determination of
death penalty procedures represents a considered judgment about who merits
death and who life. If any bill is supposed to have meaning, it is the death
penalty-and the point of the discussion so far has been to show that the
combination of factors at work in Texas's post-Furman experience prevented
the bill from having this meaningful character. Thus, even if one wants to argue
that there were no special problems associated with the passage of H.B. 200, he
must then admit, at his peril, that the Texas death penalty was only "ordinary"
legislation at very best.
IV. CONCLUSION-A NEW PAST AND PRESENT FOR FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS
I have sought to make two simultaneous points that I hope will impress
upon contemporary Texans the need for reform. The first is the now-familiar
observation that the future dangerousness standard is problematic in practice:
giving birth to interpretive confusion and to the phenomenon of Dr. Death. The
second, newer point is that these problems should not be accepted in the name
140. See id. at 4984-85.
141. See id. at 4985.
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of legislatures past because those who voted for the standard were confronted
with the confusion of Furman's nine voices, the pressure of time, and a last-
minute conference committee compromise with language they had never seen
before. The thirty-three-year-old work of the 63rd Legislature was the product
of circumstances rather than the considered judgment of the legislators, and yet
over and over again, in courtrooms from Lubbock to Laredo, defendants are
condemned to die by predictions of future dangerousness made by the most
dubious of possible "experts." In this way, Maloney's conference committee
compromise is renewed each legislative session, and with serious
consequences, despite the fact that it was born of a confusion that thirty-three
years of experience has since dispelled. The time is ripe for reform, and the
chance to do better by confronting the issue more democratically should
encourage conscientious legislators to heed the call.
Were they to revisit the issue, Texas legislators could make more informed
and deliberate decisions on multiple issues. They could choose their standard
free from the misconception that a more mandatory death penalty is the more
constitutional solution. And even if they were to decide that they truly believe
in future dangerousness, they could think longer and harder about what the
standard should mean in court, and whether "psychological" prediction should
be excluded or allowed. With three decades of doctrinal evolution and
empirical experience on their side, they could also directly confront the
unforeseen problems that future dangerousness has created for indigent
defendants, the racial inequalities the system has created, and the like. This
would replace the somewhat embarrassing birth certificate of future
dangerousness with new democratic credentials.
The choice of death penalty procedure matters enormously, and I have
endeavored to show that not only did Texas choose a standard with problematic
consequences, but it reached that decision in a problematic way. I have traced
the Dr. Death phenomenon back to the moment when future dangerousness was
born, and have found it lacking in (at least idealistic) democratic roots.
Confusion about Furman-not democratic procedures of anything close to an
ideal form-created future dangerousness, which as a standard had no more
content to those who chose it than it has to the judges and juries who must try
to interpret its ambiguities today. By rethinking the outcome of 1973's
confused push toward reenactment, today's legislators could cure not only the
problems of future dangerousness in application, but also the democratic
deficits of its conception.

